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National Models for Regulating On-board
Protection of Vessels: Some Cross-cutting
Issues
Birgit Feldtmann, Christian Frier & Paul Mevis*
1 Introduction
The topic of this special issue is flag states’ legal
approaches to on-board protection of merchant vessels
by Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel
(PCASPs) or Vessel Protection Detachment (VPDs), a
development which was especially triggered by Somali-
based piracy. The idea of armed on-board protection is
basically to merge targets (ships and seafarers) and their
defenders (guards) into a single defensive unit and there-
by minimise the risk of successful hijackings. This
approach, which has to be considered on the national
level in accordance with the flag state principle, is part
of the wider approach that the international community
has taken, and which has contributed to a huge reduc-
tion in attacks and hijackings for the benefit of crews,
ships and cargoes.
On-board protection is a phenomenon that provokes a
number of legal challenges and uncertainties, which
from a regulatory perspective have to be addressed on
the national level and in the wider context of the inter-
national law of the sea. The four country reports in this
special issue illustrate the diverse approaches and the
underlying policy concerns which can come into play
when flag states develop their own approach and regula-
tory model. The in-depth analyses in the country
reports provide a picture of the issues at stake from a
national perspective.
In the light of the informative and comprehensive coun-
try reports, one could be tempted to engage in a classic
comparison of the contributions. However, that is not
the approach we have chosen. Instead, we will leave any
comparison of the national regulatory models to the
reader. Our approach is to focus on a number of cross-
cutting issues that illustrate the legal considerations and
dilemmas at hand and provide opportunities to reflect
and discuss overall questions associated with the use of
on-board protection. Those cross-cutting issues are
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interrelated and overlapping; it is our belief that they
lead us to questions of universal interest. Of course, we
take into account the fact that the country reports
encompassed in this special issue represent a small but
at the same time diverse sample from the total number
of flag states that allow armed guards.
2 Cross-cutting the Legal
Framework
Having to find their own way, it is not surprising that
Denmark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands started
to debate and draft their specific legal approach within
the sphere of their own legal system and on the basis of
their respective legal system’s underlying ideas and
approaches. In all four countries, the development of
the regulatory models was, more or less, connected with
fundamental discussions about the interests at stake and
national opinions on the rule of law. From a starting
point, we can see the difference between countries with
no regulation that allow PCASPs (Italy, the Netherlands
and Denmark) and Germany where the discussion star-
ted because the actual general legislation seemed to
allow ‘too much’ and therefore it was felt there was a
need to regulate the use of PCASPs far more restrictive-
ly in a lex specials. We also see, more importantly, the
significant difference between the two countries (Italy
and the Netherlands) which were convinced that a state-
based approach (VPDs only) is preferable or at least
were convinced this was the correct starting point of
national regulation. The somewhat ‘idealistic’ state-
based approach rather than ‘privatisation approach’ by
the Netherlands and Italy was in due course modified,
triggered by the fear of losing ground: the increase in
the number of flag states allowing PCASPs and the sub-
sequent threat of reflagging and reduction of the nation-
al fleet seemed to be the elephant in the room pushing
for a level-playing field.
One interesting observation in the context of the differ-
ent national legal frameworks is the diverse role of the
‘state monopoly on violence’ argument: in the Nether-
lands, it still is considered to be the underlying ruling
principle for the new ‘VPD, unless’ approach, while the
German position seems to be that the use of private
armed guards does not contradict the state’s monopoly
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on the use of force, as PCASPs do not exercise any pub-
lic powers. This illustrates that common principles of
(public) law can have relatively different weights and
interpretations in domestic legal discussions, when com-
pared with similar discussions in other countries. We
address the question of the use of force in further detail
as follows.
The above-mentioned observations might make us ask
which of the two different approaches is better. Two
remarks are relevant in this regard: first, the fight
against piracy is not only about protecting a certain ves-
sel on its journey and thereby protecting the economic
interest of a given ship owner. Basically, piracy is a form
of violent international organised crime and a threat to
human lives, the freedom of navigation and free trade as
a common interest. It is, at least as far as Somalia is con-
cerned, the result of the political, social and economic
chaos in that country. If a state chooses to perceive the
fight against piracy in the broader perspective of law
enforcement, justice, regional capacity building and
upholding law and order at sea, the choice for a VPD
approach might be obvious. However, as illustrated in
the international perspective in this special issue, the
placement of state representatives on private vessels is
not without legal challenges. It can also be argued that a
PCASP approach does not necessarily mean that a state
is neglecting the wider perspective. Both the German
and the Danish answer appears to be that the approach
can be two-fold – with a ‘privatisation solution’ on
board commercial vessels and a state-based approach by
participating in international counter-piracy operations
at sea and in capacity building on shore at the same
time. On that note, it can be concluded that the general
tendency seems to be that at the current stage of devel-
opments today, states seem to be downsizing the law
enforcement approach (e.g. by deploying fewer naval
vessels to counter piracy) and with the focus now on the
protection of economic interests.
The second observation concerns what could be descri-
bed as the density or comprehensiveness of the legal
framework: if we compare the two countries with a
PCASP approach from the very beginning (Denmark
and Germany), it is obvious that within this common
approach there exist substantial differences in the
approaches towards the governance and control of
PCASPs (we will get back to this in due course). How-
ever, the essential observation is this that while Den-
mark to a large extent leaves further regulation to the
private sector, Germany has chosen a (public) law
approach with rather strict and detailed regulation. In
other words, the question is not necessarily whether the
option of public or private armed protection is prefera-
ble as such. The real factor seems to be the question of
how and to what extent the issues at stake are regulated
and enforced in practice. This means that the quality of
a given approach depends on the broader goals and aims
of the respective regulation in a certain country and the
way this works out in reality.
3 Controlling Security
Providers: The Cross-cutting
Issue of Authorisation
A prerequisite for using armed on-board protection in
the first place is the requirement that authorisation must
be obtained. This functions as a guarantee for ensuring
that only reputable security providers are contracted. A
common feature in the four regulation models is that
authorisations are issued by public authorities. Notwith-
standing, three interesting points can be deduced from
the country reports. First, the recipient of the authorisa-
tion and the level of detail which must be observed dif-
fers to a large extent. Generally, it is a requirement for
supplying armed on-board protection that the security
provider has obtained national authorisation before-
hand. This is the situation under both German and Ital-
ian law and stipulated in the Dutch draft proposal. Also,
the German authorisation scheme borrows very heavily
from international standards as noted by Salomon. The
density of the authorisation scheme cannot be accounted
for in the Dutch proposal but coming from a VPD solu-
tion only, it is fair to assume that such an authorisation
scheme will not be lax. Interestingly, as noted by Frier,
the Danish authorisation scheme varies greatly from the
other systems in the way that the addressee of the
authorisation is in fact only the ship owner. Thus,
security providers are not subject to individual adminis-
trative control or authorisation under Danish law.
Second, under some of the regulation models the
authorisation must not be mixed up with the need for a
separate licence to hire security providers for a certain
transport (the Netherlands) or the allowance to use cer-
tain weapons such as automatic firearms (Italy). This
leads to another crucial issue in connection with armed
on-board protection, which does not seem to be fully
addressed in all flag states: the issue of how to get weap-
ons on board and the legal challenges connected to hav-
ing weapons on board while passing through other
coastal states’ territorial waters. As Feldtmann briefly
raises in the chapter on the international law, the provi-
sions of the United Nations Convention for the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS) might be interpreted in different
ways by different coastal states and the legal uncertain-
ties have been a factor in the development of floating
armouries, which again leads to a number of legal ques-
tions and uncertainties.
Third, the country reports illustrate clearly that the
division of powers between administrative bodies and
private actors varies greatly between the different flag
states. While the German system is dominated by a
tight, state-based authorisation process, the Danish
system leaves most of the responsibilities to private
actors (ship owners and security providers), and the
state authorities have in fact a minor role in the process.
This means that there are differences in the level of state
control.
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The foregoing means that security companies, while
providing the same kind of services, have to operate in
and deal with a complex mixture of diverse national
approaches and regulations. Thus, having gained
authorisation to operate under one system does not
mean that the same service provider can provide the
same service under another system without any further
obstacles. This is interesting as the shipping industry
deals in international trade and is very much used to
harmonisation and standardisation.
4 Controlling Violence: The
Cross-cutting Issue of the
Use of Force
The international perspective and the four country
reports clearly illustrate that one of the crucial topics in
connection with both the employment of PCASPs and
VPDs is the issue of the use of force. This raises the fol-
lowing question: what is the legal framework regarding
the use of weapons to repel pirate attacks and as a last
resort to take human lives?
The question of the use of force is essentially a question
of ‘controlling violence’ and also a question of the distri-
bution of powers between states and their citizens.
From a legal perspective, the question of the use of force
can be reflected upon from different points of departure
with different connected legal considerations. One point
of departure is the perspective of the international law
of the sea, which, as shown by Feldtmann, does not
explicitly deal with the use of force, neither in connec-
tion with state actors’ use of force in a general law
enforcement or in a specific counter-piracy setting, nor
with a view to private actors exercising the individual
right to self-defence. Nevertheless, the use of force
exercised in self-defence is implicitly taken for granted
in the legal regime established by the law of the sea,
without giving any further guidance.
Another point of departure is the human rights perspec-
tive. Italy, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands are
all party to the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and the scope of Article 2 of ECHR is central
in any approach to the control of violence and threats to
life. In a nutshell, the human rights perspective leads to
at least two obligations. First, the state’s use of lethal
force against individuals must be limited to an absolute
minimum and can only be used as a last resort. Second,
the individual right to life is linked to the individual
right to self-defence, meaning that the protection of
innocent lives can, as a last resort, justify the taking of
‘less innocent’ lives. From a state-based perspective, as
shown in the Dutch country report and briefly men-
tioned earlier, the issue of the use of force can on the
national level be perceived as a crucial question of the
state’s monopoly on force. This perspective was also
raised in Germany. What might be surprising is that it
seems that the question of the state’s monopoly on force
has not been raised in all countries – in Denmark a simi-
lar discussion has basically been absent. One could
argue that the question of the state’s monopoly on force
is not really challenged if the protection of vessels is
exclusively seen from a self-protection perspective; the
issue at stake is not the transfer of state powers to pri-
vate actors, but an issue of the individual right to self-
defence and nothing more. This seems to be the conclu-
sion in Germany and the underlying assumption in
Denmark.
The issue of the use of force by PCASPs and the specif-
ic boundaries for legitimate self-defence are a subject for
regulation on the national level. The country reports
indicate that a typical approach is to rely on the general
principle of self-defence in criminal law and not to
develop a specific legal framework for the use of force in
this specific setting. German lawmakers have gone one
step further by trying to operationalise the concept.
Only the Netherlands have opted for the VPD approach
and are not leaning on the general concept of self-
defence in criminal law. As shown in the Danish coun-
try report, maritime stakeholders might turn to soft-law
instruments for guidance on how to operationalise the
right to self-defence in case of pirate attacks. In this
context, the German approach is interesting: the outline
of the German legal system shows that the issue of the
use of force/self-defence is included in the process of
authorisation. The aim seems here to be to ensure suffi-
cient knowledge of the legal framework for self-defence
and thereby ensuring some kind of control over the use
of force on the vessel. It might also be worthwhile to
mention that Italy and Germany require special licences
for the use of particular weapons (especially semiauto-
matic weapons).
Another important issue in connection with the control
of the use of force is reporting obligations (post-incident
reports) and other oversight mechanisms. All regulatory
models seem to struggle with the difficulty of securing
the control of the use of force on a vessel far from all of
the usual (land-based) systems of compliance. To bridge
the gap, all countries have incorporated systems of
reporting; reporting to maritime authorities or the Min-
istry of Justice, or even to the public prosecutors. Inter-
estingly, there is a dualistic approach of double-report-
ing (master and team leader) in Germany and the Neth-
erlands, whereas in Denmark only one report (issued by
the ship owner and based on information provided by
the master) is sufficient.
In the German system, the obligatory use of cameras
was discussed but not made mandatory. The upcoming
Dutch legislation, which is the result of intense discus-
sions in the Dutch Parliament, requires that armed
guards use cameras. Associated camera recordings will
have to be annexed to reports about specific incidents in
which weapons were used. Reading this provision from
a criminal law perspective, one might add that, as we
can read in the country reports, the Italian and German
regulations provide for specific provisions to protect the
persons involved against an obligation of self-incrimina-
tion (nemo tenetur principle), whereas the Dutch and the
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Danish laws do not contain any provision in this
respect. Under the law of the latter, guards and the mas-
ter must turn to the general ECHR protection principles
in this respect.
5 Chain of Command: The
Cross-cutting Issue of Who
Is in Charge
Another interesting observation in connection with the
country reports is that there were quite similar discus-
sions about the exact position of the master, his authori-
ty and responsibility if on-board protection is used.
Remarkably, this is one of the few topics where the
international law of the sea provides for a rather clear
legal basis: the overall authority of the master on all
matters connected to the vessels, its navigation and crew
is articulated in a number of conventions, for example,
in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at
Sea (SOLAS), Regulation 34.1. However, the question
remains what this legal position means in practice if we
connect the master’s authority with the specific topics of
the use of force and the individual right to self-defence.
First, those topics do not normally fall under the mas-
ter’s training and experience. Second, as pointed out by
Feldtmann, in practice the relation and division of pow-
ers between the master, team leader and individual
guard is rather complex. This point is illustrated by
looking at the provisions in Italy, Germany and the
Netherlands. According to the Dutch parliamentary
debate, the responsibility and criminal liability of the
master is limited to obvious cases in which he must use
his authority to stop the obvious use of disproportionate
violence as decided and ordered by the team leader
(after consultation with the master). But in Germany
and Italy, the same overall authority of the master, as
codified in the International Law of the Sea, has resul-
ted in a different interpretation. According to Italian
law, the master has to order the use of violence, for
example, the occupation of the defensive positions on
board and the preparation to use firearms. Interestingly,
this rather important question has not played a particu-
lar role in the Danish discussions. These different inter-
pretations and rules concerning the master’s position in
connection with the use of force/self-defence lead to a
situation where the masters must meet different
requirements in different flag states. The question of
responsibility of the master in connection with the use
of force can have an implication for a possible criminal
liability; however, it does not mean that the master is
the first or only person to face investigations and prose-
cution in case of disproportionate use of force.
6 Concluding Remarks/
Schlussbemerkung/Ten
slotte/konklusion/
conclusioni
In the introduction to this special issue it was predicted
that the regulatory models on the national level in Den-
mark, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands might differ
at a level that we have called the ‘level of privatisation’.
We stated earlier that we would return to this perspec-
tive in this final contribution. Given the informative and
comprehensive country reports, the differentiation in
the level of privatisation is obvious. However, recent
developments have lessened these differences regarding
the level of privatisation.
Perhaps this observation is more important: it is our
conclusion that the differences in the level of privatisa-
tion are not necessarily the main points of relevance
when it comes to evaluating the national approaches and
provisions. More important is the answer to the ques-
tion of to what extent national law provides for suffi-
ciently detailed regulation and control mechanisms to
address the complex and sensitive aspects of on-board
protection in general and in the use of PCASPs in par-
ticular. How are the employment of PCASPs and their
(potential) use of firearms and the related risks guided,
regulated and controlled by the flag state at hand? One
can argue that even if this leads to diverse approaches
for security companies to navigate in, it could be an
advantage if national legal systems deal with the issues
at hand as long as they do their utmost to regulate and
control the use of PCASPs and the subsequent use of
force in their national law as specifically and effectively
as possible. An alternative could be common European
or international uniform rules which possibly would not
rise over a basic level of guarantees and control. In reali-
ty, the different approaches and regulations under
national law of a ‘tight’ approach with strong regulation
and ‘quality control’ could result in an economic
advantage: Salomon describes that the detailed German
system of authorisation could function as a ‘seal of
approval’ and ‘quality guarantee’ for companies that
have met these high standards. On the other hand, a
complicated and expensive authorisation process or
state-based model might lead to threats of reflagging.
However, if a flag state wants to brand itself as a ‘quali-
ty’ flag state, a responsible approach should be the pref-
erable one.
Our final conclusion is that the issue of the use of fire-
arms and associated risks calls for regulations that take
more than the economic perspective into account. We
believe that all four flag states that are described in this
special issue understand this very well. However, they
have chosen rather different approaches. None of them
seem to have found the ‘definitive’ (optimal) solution to
all associated problems and legal uncertainties, and per-
haps the suspicion is that there is no solution which fits
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all. There is also another aspect associated with this: at
the end of the day, violence, however well-regulated and
controlled, will never be the final, sole answer to any
complex problem. To be frank: the use of armed on-
board protection, be it PCASPs or VPDs, should be
considered as management of a symptom rather than a
long-term solution. It should be only one of many
approaches towards modern piracy, which is a complex
phenomenon and a problem the international communi-
ty must solve by taking a comprehensive approach. As
the former U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, put
it so clearly in connection with the Maersk Alabama
incident in 2009 (as cited in our introduction): ‘We may
be dealing with a 17th-century crime, but we need to
bring 21st century solutions to bear.’ It seems that the
international community, as shown by Feldtmann, has
understood this and the three-pillar approach of the
international community and the maritime stakeholders
towards the Somali problem of piracy has been some-
what successful. It is important to keep the momentum
going and to continue to deal with the problem of piracy
by multiple, supplementary approaches, guided by
human rights and the fundamental principles of the rule
of law.
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